Enterprise-related training and poaching externalities by Alexandre Léné
 
 1 
14th EALE conference 19-22 September 2002 













Abstract: Labour poaching is a potential problem in work-linked training systems. Once trained, 
young people can be poached by rival firms, which threatened the training firm’s investment. A 
distinction is made between two types of workforce poaching. It is shown that it may be rational for 
some firms to train young people, even if they then lose part of their workforce. However, this 
situation is not socially optimal: it does not exclude underinvestment or skilled labour shortages. This 
may justify government intervention. However, the introduction of subsidies can have perverse effects. 
 





There is a broad consensus in Europe today on the advantages of work-linked training, 
a system that combines practical training in firms and formal training in educational 
establishments. Vocational, enterprise-related training is a means of developing not only 
employees’ technical expertise but also the aptitudes and cognitive competences that enable 
them to work effectively in a rapidly changing environment (Berryman and Bailey, 1992). 
Indeed, training and experience are two complementary components of skill, and 
contemporary technical and organisational developments serve only to reinforce this 
complementarity (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000).  
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However, can this type of training principle really be put into practice? It relies on 
firms taking on young people and equipping them with transferable competences. From a 
theoretical point of view, we are dealing here with one of the fundamental theorems of human 
capital theory, which states that companies cannot finance general training.  
For a company which provides some training to its employees in the course of 
employment, the risk of poaching can be limited or controlled. The investments in general 
training are associated to investments in specific training; which allows the training firm to 
propose higher wages than its competitors (Feuer et alii, 1987). Furthermore, the exact nature 
of the training received by an employee is not easily observable for a potential external 
employer. The training is then valued below its market price on the market. This asymmetry 
of information confers some market power to the employer and allows him to invest in 
general training (Katz and Ziderman, 1990 ; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).  
On the other hand, in the initial training systems poaching is a major problem for the 
firms. In these systems, training leads to competences that are recognised in the labour market 
and may be validated by certificates or diplomas, thereby making the training both 
identifiable and transferable (Casey, 1991; Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000). For those 
companies providing work-linked training, poaching is not just a potential risk but a tangible 
reality. Some firms lose a proportion of the young people they train (Booth and Satchell, 
1994). The end of the training period is often the time at which young people decide to 
change company1. Nevertheless, employers pay a significant part of the general training of the 
young people they take on without going bankrupt (Jones, 1986). The aim of this article is to 
                                                 
1  Most of the young people leave the company which trained them at the end of an apprenticeship contract. In 
France, the rates of keeping of the training companies vary from 11% to 26% according to sectors. The end of a 
“qualification contract” is also frequently accompanied by a change of company. The rate of keeping was 28,7 % 










































show that this situation is rational. It seeks to explain how firms can be led to invest in the 
training of young people whom they will not necessarily retain.  
For that purpose, we reason in a market made up of heterogeneous firms and structured 
by an imperfect competition. Within this framework, we show that training is not only 
transferable in the sense of Steven (1994), the companies are threatened by a second kind of 
poaching which is based on the attraction power of the firms and on the possibility that have 
the competitors to transform the manpower which they takeover. In our analysis, it is thus less 
the nature of the training provided than the position of the various firms on the labour market 
which determines the labour flows.  
The paper is organised as follows. We analyse the risks of staff poaching within a 
market assumed to be made up of heterogeneous companies and define two types of labour 
poaching (Part  II). We will then go on to show that it may be in the interests of some 
companies to provide training, even if they then lose some of their trained staff to ‘dominant’ 
companies (Part III). However, this situation is not socially optimal. The labour market still 
suffers from localised skill shortages. This may be good reason for government intervention, 
particularly through the provision of training subsidies. However, this type of intervention is 
not without its own perverse effects (Part IV).  
2. Two kinds of poaching externalities  
2.1. Worker’s value and rent sharing 
  Consider a labour market in which workers and firms are heterogeneous. The agent 
skills are symbolized by a multidimensional vector [ Si]  = (s1, s2, …, sn). The components of 
this vector are the agent’s characteristics determining the ability to perform various tasks. 










































other characteristics such as interpersonal, organizational and managerial skills, diagnostic 
and analytical skills, etc. (Wolff, 2000). 
Let vij be worker i’s productivity in firm j. For a particular worker, the marginal 
product varies across firms. The worker’s productive characteristics are not uniformly priced 
across firms (Heckman and Scheinkman, 1987); some of his skills are more valuable in one 
firm than in another. Suppose that there are N firms in the economy. Then the worker’s 
potential value can be described by the vector: 
 (vi1, vi2, ... , vik, ... , viN)  
  In the market equilibrium, a worker matches with the firm in which his productivity 
value is highest (McLaughlin, 1994). This match generates a differential rent Mij. This 
differential rent is the difference between vij the worker’s value in firm j and vM his value in 
his second highest-valuing employer (Sattinger, 1979). 
Mij = vij −  vM           ( 1 )  
with vM = Max
k  { vik}           ∀  k ≠  j, k ∈  { 1, ..., N}  
The wage contract is a simple rent-sharing agreement. Worker i and firm j sign a contract that 
pays the worker a wage equal to his opportunity wage plus a share of the rent to the match2.  
wij = µ  (vij - vM) + vM  (2) 
Where 0 ≤  µ  ≤  1 is the rent-sharing parameter which reflects the determinants of bargaining 
strength.  
                                                 










































  The wage is an outcome of bilateral bargaining3. The outside option of the employee, 
vM, and the worker’s productivity in the firm, vij, drive a wedge between the lowest wage for 
which the employee will work and the highest wage the employer will pay. Bargaining 
determines where within the wedge the wage will lie. Firms are able to obtain market power 
in the labour market that allows them to set wages below the productivity of workers: 
 a ij = (1 - µ ) (vij - vM) = vij - wij   (3) 
aij represents the part of the rent that the firm appropriates. 
2.2. Job requirements and firms’ training programmes 
Firms are heterogeneous in their job requirements. Firms who use 
different  combinations of specialised technology, or different patterns of work 
organisation, require workers with particular sets of skills. For simplicity, suppose that a firm 
is fully described by the type of worker it needs. Firm j’s skill requirement is denoted by the 
vector [ Rj]  = (r1j, , ..., rkj, ... , rnj). This is the minimal set of skills needed for the tasks involved 
in job j to be totally satisfied.  
The school cannot provide a manpower perfectly adapted to every firm. There are 
unavoidable "skill gaps" between the young people leaving the school system and the jobs 
offered by the firms. Thus, if firm j hires a worker whose skill vector [ Si]  differs from [ Rj] , the 
worker must be trained. The firm trains him in order to equip him with competences required 
for the job to be provided. The degree of mis-match determines the amount and the kind of 
job-related training needed to close the skills gap; and the cost of training to meet the firm’s 
                                                 
3 One may think of wij as the generalised Nash solution to the bargaining game that is played if the firm employs 
the worker: to maximise the Nash product (wij - w0)
µ .(vij - wij- π 0)
1 - µ  with respect to wij; where wM and π 0 are 
the payoffs that the employee and the firm receive if the negotiations break down; and π 0 = 0 in the absence of 










































requirement is a function of the difference between the skill requirements and the worker’s 
skill level (Eijs and Heijke, 2000). From this perspective, the labour market is an implicit 
market for learning opportunities that is dual to the market for jobs (Thurow, 1975). Firms 
purchase skills services and at the same time provide jobs offering learning possibilities.  
2.3. A first kind of poaching 
Companies compete with each other for the use of skilled labour. They are therefore all 
at risk of having workers poached by an external firm. The problem of poaching is 
traditionally analysed with the aid of the notions of general training and specific training 
defined by Becker (1975). Becker demonstrates that firms do not pay for investment in 
general human capital, while firms and workers share the cost of investment in specific 
human capital.  
In an economy made up of heterogeneous firms where workers’ value varies from one 
company to another, Becker’s principles are invalidated. Stevens (1994) shows that in fact 
general training and specific training are polar cases. Training is often neither perfectly 
general nor completely specific. Most of the time, training cannot be regarded as the sum of 
two components, one completely general, and the other completely specific. Dissatisfaction 
with Becker’s concepts has led Stevens to define the new concept of ‘transferable training’. A 
training programme is transferable if it is of some value to at least one firm in addition to the 
training firm. Training raises the productivity of a worker in certain firms, but not in all, at 
least not equally. In an economy made up of heterogeneous firms, training in company j 
confers on individual i a value  vik
j  in each of N enterprises. The potential post-training 
productivity of the worker is described by the vector: 
[ vik
j ]  = (vij
j, vi
j
1, , ... , vik














































A sum of general and specific training would be described by: 
[  vik
j ]  = (g + s, g, g, ... , g)   (5) 
Actually, there are many other possibilities which cannot be regarded as the sum of a general 
and specific component. In general, we will have: 
[  vik
j ]   = (vij
j, λ 1⋅ vij
j,  ... , λ N⋅ vij
j)   where  λ 1 ≠  λ 2 ≠ ... ≠  λ N 
The transferable components of training vary across firms in accordance with their 
characteristics4. This translates as a variable increase in the individual’s productivity in N 
other firms in the market. The risk of workers being poached can therefore be assessed on the 
basis of the differential rent Mij at the end of the training period.  
Mij = vij
j −  Max
k  {  vik
j }      ∀  k ≠  j, k ∈  { 1, ..., N}      (6) 
The transferability of the set of competences can be analysed as a function of the 
sign of Mij. If Mij >  0, the risk of poaching is zero. If Mij ≤  0, there is at least one competing 
company in which the productive value of the trained individual is at least equal to that of the 
individual in the company that provided the training. The company is thereby subject to the 
risk of having members of its workforce poached. This formula allows Becker’s concepts of 
general training and specific training5 to be applied more generally. 
                                                 
4 Many studies confirm the fact that the productivities for individuals with a given education are not identical, 
but vary systematically with the firm characteristics: the technology, the kind of sector in which the firm is 
operating, the size of the firm (Hartog and Jonker, 1998). 
5 With the formula that we are using, if training is general in the strict sense of the term given by Becker, then: 
[  vik
j ]  = (g, g, ..., g)  
We will then have: Mij = 0. The company is indeed at risk of losing employees.   
When training is specific: [  vik
j ]  = (sj, 0,0, ... , 0)  
We will have: Mij = vij










































2.4. A second kind of poaching: poaching with training 
The concept of transferability reflects the immediate potential use of individual’s skills 
in a set of rival firms. This approach assumes implicitly that it is the same vector of 
competences that is valued by the initial firm and the firms which poach the trained 
employees. The competing firms do not however content with poaching the employees of the 
other firms to employ them directly. They attract them and adapt them to their requirements. 
They transform their vector of competences because they are rarely perfectly in alignment 
with the skills required in the job concerned. To adapt the competences of poached workers 
requires time, additional investments and costs (transfer costs). This is confirmed by Shaw’s 
study (1987), which showed that individuals leave their jobs for more highly paid and skilled 
positions but that these ‘promotions’ result in additional ‘occupational investments’.  
Even if the individual trained by a company j is not directly useful in a rival firm k, 
thanks to the competence which he acquired, he can more easily adapt to the characteristics of 
this firm. Those will be able to adapt quickly, and at lower cost, to the various opportunities 
of employment which are offered to them. This defines a second possible type of poaching.  
Let Tjk be the cost of transfer from the present firm j to firm k. Tjk is the training 
investment required to adjust the worker to firm k. For an individual to leave training firm j, 
he or she must have prospects of higher earnings. The individual’s earnings prospects depend 
on his potential productive value in the different firms in the market after training. Thus an 
individual’s earnings prospects in external firms are no longer apprehended by means of the 
vector (vi1
j, vi2
j, ... , viN
j), which reflects the immediate productivity of an individual trained by 










































productivity once he or she has been adapted to the different characteristics of the various 
firms6. Firm j is threatened by this second type of poaching if a firm k exists, such that: 
Vij < Vik - Tjk   (7) 
Under these circumstances, we can say that firm k dominates firm j. In an economy 
made up of heterogeneous firms, we will find dominated  firms, who are subject to their 
workforce being poached, and dominant firms, who not only avoid having their employees 
poached, but are also able to take advantage of their position to poach those of the firms they 
dominate. Many empirical studies support this labour market structure. In France, Cahuc et 
alii (1990) established the existence of two distinct groups of firms : 
- a group of firms characterised by "non-constrained" internal labour markets. It includes 
large companies whose employees can with difficulty obtain higher wages by changing 
employer. These companies can retain their employees by offering them interesting 
perspectives in terms of incomes and careers;  
- a group of firms characterised by external labour markets. It includes smaller enterprises. In 
these firms, the employees are much more sensitive to the outside opportunities: they can 
obtain higher wages by leaving the company and by finding a job in a bigger company.  
We defend the idea that it is the second kind of poaching that is fundamental. There is 
rarely professional mobility without transformation of the manpower skills. Even if a worker 
is immediately productive, he does not avoid a phase of adaptation. Moreover, the first kind 
of poaching can always be interpreted as a second kind of poaching whose transfer cost is null 
(Vik = vijk and Tjk = 0). The traditional concept of poaching is only a particular case of the 
second kind of poaching. One thus can consider that any poaching is a poaching with training. 
                                                 











































That leads us to relativize the role of specific skills. A firm which endows its 
employees with specific skills does not avoid the risk of poaching insofar as this specific 
training does not abolish poaching with training. The firms which keep their employees are 
those that dominate their competitors; that is those that, considering their productive 
organization and their technology, value most the work of their employees. In the same way, 
if some firms finance training "which is useful in the other firms" (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 
1998), if they keep their employees and if they appropriate a part of the returns on the 
"general" training (Bishop, 1991), it is because they are not dominated on their labour market.  
3. A model of training with asymmetrical competition between firms 
In the remainder of this paper, we develop a formal model to demonstrate some of the 
implications of these externalities for the training decisions made by firms. The purpose of 
this paper is to analyse a simple two firms model which incorporates some of the asymmetries 
that keep labour markets from functioning perfectly. This is accomplished by assuming that 
one firm dominates the other. This setting is not only realistic, as supported by empirical 
studies, but it defines a general framework of analysis in which perfect competition appears as 
a particular situation that could be explored. 
3.1 Model assumptions  
We assume that each firm’s labour needs are determined exogenously: nj represents the 
number of additional qualified staff workers sought by firm j.  
   nj = Nj
* - Nj
t-1            ( 8 )  
where Nj
* represents the firm’s desired size of workforce in period t  
and Nj










































Untrained individuals have constant productivity, initialised to zero, in all firms. The 
firms are characterised by constant returns to scale for skilled workers: each employee brings 
aj to firm j up to point Nj*; once this staffing level has been reached, additional workers serve 
no function, their value is zero. 
The net costs of training m trainees are given by a continuous twice differentiable 
function C  =  C(m), where C’(m)  >  0, C”(m) >  0. The most appropriate form for the cost 
function is a quadratic function of the type: 
   C(m) = u m
2 + b        w i t h     u > 0  and  b > 0    (9) 
This assumption reflects diseconomies of scale in teaching. Firms run into constraints 
of capital equipment required for training as the number of trainees increase. Furthermore, 
increasing the number of trainees per trainer leads to a drop in the quality and the efficacy of 
the training process (Rosen, 1987).  
3.2. The training firm and the poaching firm  
Consider an economy in which there are two firms: firm A and firm B. Let us assume 
that firm A dominates firm B, expressed as: ViB < ViA - TBA. Firm A is more attractive than 
firm B (ViA > ViB); staff there are more productive and receive better pay. What is more, 
training is profitable for firm A; the differential rent that the employer and employee share 
(ViA - ViB = aiA) is greater than the cost of training TBA.  
3.2.1. Firm A’s strategy: poach the maximum number of employees 
Firm A can increase its workforce in two ways. First, it can poach workers from other 










































be adjusted to the job requirements of the firm. Second, unskilled individuals entering the 
labour market can be added to the firm through training. 
As the training provided by firm B is transferable, the transfer costs that firm A will 
have to meet for staff coming from firm B will be lower than the training costs associated 
with individuals leaving the education system. It is more economical to adapt experienced 
workers than to train inexperienced individuals leaving education. Firm A, which wants to 
minimise its training costs, will try to have the initial training needs met by the dominated 
firm by poaching its staff once training has finished. Firm A will provide initial training only 
when it cannot poach enough staff. We will eliminate this scenario from our argument by 
assuming that nA < NB
t-1: the poaching practised by firm A is not limited by the size of the 
workforce at firm B.  
Firm A’s profit is therefore equal to: 
  π A = aA NA* - TBA(nA)        ( 1 0 )  
Each employee brings aA to firm A, with the firm meeting a transfer cost of TBA(nA). 
3.2.2. Firm B’s situation: coping with systematic poaching of part of its workforce 
Firm B’s profit, depending on whether or not it trains young people, is equal to: 
No Training:      π B
NT = aB (NB
t-1 - nA)      ( 1 1 )  
Training:     π B
T =  aB (NB
t-1 + m - nA) - CB(m)     (12) 
- the ‘No Training’ strategy refers to no further training of new recruits by the firm B which 
has already trained in the previous periods. Firm B suffers poaching equal to nA and employs 
a workforce of size NB










































- the ‘Training’ strategy: the firm trains a number m of young people and suffers a level of 
poaching nA; the size of its workforce is then NB
t-1 - nA + m. It also has to meet training costs. 
Its profit is given by equation (12). 
Whether it provides training or not, part of firm B’s workforce is poached by firm A. 
In view of this systematic poaching, equal to nA, the question that needs to be answered is 
whether or not firm B should provide training and, if so, on what scale. 
  The first step in answering this question is to determine the value of m*, the optimal 
number of trainees for firm B, whilst remaining aware that part of its workforce will be 
systematically poached by firm A. The second step is to determine whether it is preferable to 
train these m* new entrants or to refrain from such an investment.  
3.3. Determining the number of new entrants m* trained by firm B 
The optimal number m* of new entrants for firm B to train is the one that will allow it 
to maximise its profit (equation 12). The first order condition for maximisation with 
respect to m is:  





      ( 1 3 )  
In appendix 1, we demonstrate that the number m* of trainees that maximises the profit for 
firm B is not necessarily equal to nA + nB : 
















































No. of individuals 






Graphically, point m* is that at which the tangent to curve C(m) has aB as its slope. So 
long as the marginal gain associated with training a new entrant is higher than its marginal 
cost, the firm will invest in training. It is therefore rational for firm B to train a number of 
young people lower than nA + nB. This means that firm B may decide to train new staff whilst 
still suffering a shortage of skilled labour. It actually has (nB + nA - m*) employees fewer than 
it needs to reach the size of workforce it requires. 
3.4. Firm B’s dilemma: to train or not to train? 
With the value of m* determined, the question that arises for firm B is whether or not it 
is preferable to train m* new entrants and to meet the costs of this training (while also 
possibly finding itself under-staffed), or not to train and suffer an even greater labour 
shortage. Firm B will decide its strategy by comparing its potential gains from each of these 
different strategies. Firm B will prefer to train if:  
    π B
T(m*) >  π B
NT  










































If m*⋅  aB < CB(m*), firm B would do best not to train and to allow all of the workers 
needed by firm A to leave. Firm B would therefore have to deal with a labour shortage equal 
to nA + nB. Even though it would have to take on more staff, it would be preferable for it to 
suffer the labour shortage than to meet the costs of training. Not only does the dominated firm 
have to be capable of meeting the costs of training all of its new staff, it also has to be 
preferable for it to train these individuals than to suffer labour shortages. So when 
π B
NT > π B
T(m*) > 0, firm  B has the means to train staff because the gains are higher than the 
costs of training (π B
T(m*) > 0), but it is rational for it to refrain from training and to remain 
understaffed.  
However, if m*⋅  aB > CB(m*), the best option for the dominated firm is to train m* new 
entrants. It should be noted that if m* < (nB + nA), it does not profit fully from its training 
investment and is understaffed. The dominated firm supplies the labour market with trained 
staff whilst at the same time suffering labour shortages of its own. A paradoxical equilibrium 
is arrived at: the dominated firm trains young people, it provides trained workers for the 
labour market but nevertheless suffers labour shortages.  
It is quite possible to extend these findings to cases involving more than two firms. On 
the labour market, dominated firms are encountered that train inexperienced staff and so 
provide other firms with qualified, experienced staff. This has been found to be the case in 
most of the apprenticeship systems, with small firms supplying larger firms with experienced 
staff (Smits and Stromback, 2001). Small companies have to take on trainees in excess of 
their future staffing requirements, in the expectation that a certain number will leave at the 
end of their training period. Those entering the labour market therefore acquire experience 










































Until now, we reasoned within the framework of an economy where all the firms are 
differentiated. When one makes grow the number of firms, the differentiation tends to 
disappear between certain firms and the probability to find identical firms increases. When 
two companies are identical and value similarly the skills of their employees, the differential 
rent aij disappears, and the situation of symmetry reappears. Nevertheless, the condition (14) 
remains valid. It suffices to replace aB by the value 0. One finds then Becker's proposition 
according to which the employer can not finance general training. Identical firms can train 
workers only if their cost of training is null. Symmetrical competition appears as a specific 
case of imperfect competition. 
4. Skill shortages and policy implications 
4.1. Fewer trainees than is socially optimal 
We can show that the number of trainees actually trained is always lower than the 
number of young people that it would be socially optimal to train. In fact, the number of 
young people trained m* does not maximise S, the social returns from training. 
S is the sum of the value of the training firm’s output from its retained workforce, plus the 
value of output produced by trained workers in the poaching firm, less the costs to society of 
training (the training firm’s expenditure on training CB(m) and the poaching firm’s 
expenditure on training TBA(nA)). Thus S can be written as: 
  S = (NB
t-1 - nA + m).VB + (NA
t-1 + nA).VA - CB(m) - TBA(nA)   (15) 
Consider a policy maker who wishes to raise the welfare of firms and workers. 










































Chatterji, 1998). The first order condition for maximisation (15) with respect to m is:  
  V B - C'(m) = 0  where ms = 
V
2u
B  (16) 
ms being the socially optimal number of trainees. 
As m* = 
a
2u
B   and  VB = aB + wiB , we necessarily have: m* ≤  ms  
We can also show that ms cannot be greater than nA + nB. Beyond nA + nB, the return from 
training is negative. We therefore arrive at: 
m* ≤   ms ≤   nA + nB.          (17)   
Levels of output and profit over the economy are therefore lower than they could be. 
What is more, a certain number of individuals will not be recruited and trained, even though 
firms would be prepared to do this. Thus an increase in the number of young people being 
trained (up to ms) would be reflected in welfare improvements and an increase in the social 
returns to training.  
4.2. Subsidies for the training of young people? 
Subsidy is one of the tools that government can employ to correct the behaviour of 
firms in this area (Stevens, 2001). Let us assume that the state subsidises a firm by providing 
it with a lump sum s for each new trainee. The optimal level of subsidy for each firm can be 
determined. The optimal level of subsidy sB* is that which allows firm B to undertake the 





















































Let us assume that ms = nA + nB. The subsidy must modify the cost structure of firm B 
in order that the optimal number of staff for it to train is equal to nA + nB. With the hypotheses 
that we have adopted, we can demonstrate (appendix 2) that: 
 s B* = max. { u (nA + nB) + 
b
(n  +  n ) AB
 - aB  ;  2 u (nA + nB) - aB}       (18) 
Clearly, the level of subsidy that enables the firm to produce the optimal number of 
trainees varies in accordance with the firm’s characteristics. Firms operate heterogeneously in 
the market: labour needs nj, differential rent aj, and training cost parameters uj and bj vary 
from one firm to another. This means that the optimal subsidy level sj* varies from one firm 
to another. 
Ideally, the subsidy amount should perfectly match the firm’s characteristics. In 
reality, this is not practicable. The lack of flexibility in the system is a basic given of 
government intervention: subsidies come in a standardised form that cannot take into account 
the variations and diversity of situations found in the labour market. The government is 
unlikely to have sufficient information to determine the precise characteristics of each firm. 










































to all firms. The level of subsidy  s will still divide firms according to their optimal subsidy 
level sj*: 
  s 1* < s2* < ... sj* < s < sj+1*  ... < sN* 
In an economy made up of heterogeneous firms, some companies will gain more from 
state intervention than others. Those firms whose subsidy level sj* is less than amount s (the j 
first firms) gain a unitary rent linked to the hiring and training of young people equal to s -
 sj*. This deadweight spending –also called windfall gains- refers to the gains that firms 
benefit unduly from the subsidies7.  
Dominated firms may even be tempted to take on more trainees than the market can 
absorb. If the subsidy amount s is too high, firm B may be led to train a number of young 
people m* greater than nA + nB. In these circumstances, firm B will be training a number of 
young people that exceeds the recruitment capacities of firms in the local market. This 
phenomenon sustains the institutionalization of " young secondary markets " (Léné, 2002). 
5. Conclusion 
In an economy made up of heterogeneous firms, those firms providing training are 
threatened by two different types of poaching. The first type is based on the transferability of 
competences and their immediate use in a rival firm. The second type of poaching is based on 
the opportunity external firms have to adapt the workers they poach. Competing firms do not 
simply poach staff workers from other firms; they also transform the skills that have been 
acquired by the workers they poach, which requires further training investments. The analysis 
provided in this paper supplies the information required for an understanding of phenomena 
                                                 
7 Deadweight spending represents a large part of the inefficiencies of employment subsidy policies. The relative 
size of deadweight spending has been highlighted in some empirical studies in Europe. It is estimated for 40 to 










































that do not seem, a priori, to conform to theoretical predictions. The main results are as 
follows: 
- It may be rational for some firms to train staff that they will not keep. These firms are led to 
train not only their own workers but also workers who will be used by other firms. They 
therefore supply the market with experienced labour.  
- Those firms that supply the market with skilled labour may, paradoxically, find themselves 
with their own labour shortages. Although they agree to train more workers than they need, 
they may still suffer labour shortages.  
- This leads to situations that are not socially optimal and that may justify government 
intervention. However, we have shown that in practice it is difficult to set up an optimal 
subsidy mechanism for in-company training. Government intervention in this area runs up 
against problems of flexibility and transparency. If the level of subsidy is too high, dominated 
firms may be tempted to take on a higher number of trainees than the market is able to absorb.  
Numerous studies have described the conditions under which British, German and 
French apprenticeship schemes have functioned (Casey, 1991; Soskice, 1994). These studies 
focus on the historical and institutional aspects of these training schemes and highlight their 
various dysfunctions. The theoretical analysis provided in this article could be seen as 
complementing these studies by clarifying the rationale underlying these dysfunctions. It 
shows why it is difficult to regulate the training provided by employer-based youth training 
schemes. A possible extension would be to assume that trainees differ in their abilities to 
learn. Some of them will learn more quickly, and at lower cost, than others. It would be 
interesting to examine how the selection and training behaviour of companies changes when 
different categories of trainees are introduced. This would form the basis for an analysis of the 
changes to workplace training systems in a context marked by an increase of the general level 










































Appendix 1: the optimal number of trainees m*  
 
•  C(m) is a quadratic function : C(m) = u m
2 + b 
•  The gain function G(m) is defined by: 
  π B(m) = (NB
t-1 - nA + m ) aB - C(m)      over the interval ]0 ; nA +  nB[ 
  π B(m) = (NB
t-1 + nB) aB - C(m)        over the interval [nA + nB, +∞ [ 
 
Let us show that function π B(m) allows a maximum. 
C(m) is increasing, π B(m) is therefore decreasing over the second interval. It will only allow a 
maximum if it is increasing over the first interval.  
π B(m) may be increasing if its derivative G'(m) is positive over ]0 ; nA +  nB].  
    G'(m) cancels out when  aB - 2 u m = 0 






    G'(m) >0 if m < aB/2u   and   G'(m) < 0 if m > aB/2u  
 





 and decreasing thereafter. 





 < nA + nB    
If aB > 2 u (nA + nB), then m* = nA + nB  
Appendix  2: the optimal subsidy level sB* 
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hence sB* = 2 u (nA + nB) - aB  
It is also necessary that the gains of the strategy ‘Train (nA + nB) trainees’ are higher than the gains for 
the ‘No training’ strategy : 
   aB (nA + nB)+ sB* (nA + nB) - u (nA + nB)
2 - b > 0    
 i.e.  sB* > u (nA + nB) + 
b
(n  +  n ) AB
 -aB  
Therefore:  sB* = max. { u (nA + nB) + 
b
(n  +  n ) AB
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